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The domestic perspective is equally important for the analysis as the author investigates which constellations of domestic interests and institutions are conducive to the initiation and implementation of IMF-style reforms (p. 2). Specifically, he asks how the ideology of the governing coalition, coalition cohesion and stability, state bureaucratic capacity, and electoral considerations mediate the above international pressures. More fundamentally, he contributes to one of the most important debates in international political economy, namely the relationship between neoliberalism and democracy.
Pop-Eleches's theoretical claim is that domestic and external economic crises do not uniformly drive the IMF programs (a frequent assumption), but rather, these are mediated by politics at the domestic and international levels (p.6). Thus, the government engages in a balancing act of its partisan policy preferences and financial considerations inherent in IMF programs, all while being subject to the political constraint represented by the opposition. The IMF, on the other hand, prefers to lend to reliable partners as it wants a return on its investment, but it also strives to maintain international financial stability (p. 289). The author then methodically unpacks the economic and political context of interactions between the government and the IMF. Moreover, the IMF tends to pay more attention to the bigger market players and debtors who threaten international financial stability than to smaller, otherwise equally (or even relatively more) needy states. However, as Pop-Eleches demonstrates, the link between economic crisis and IMF-style reforms is not automatic. Rather, ideology plays a mediating role, which depends on the nature and severity of the crisis.
In the ideologically polarized Cold War world, Latin America of the 1980s generally experienced partisan policy divergence as the right-of-center governments embraced IMF-style reforms when faced with an economic crisis, while the left eschewed them, often despite considerable costs. The exception was the liquidity crises, which resulted in crisis-driven partisan policy convergence. However, the much more prominent role played by the debt crisis and attendant social dynamics led to the persistent role of ideology in Latin American political economy of the 1980s. This is in stark contrast to Eastern Europe, where partisan policy convergence followed an onset of significant economic crisis and ideology only mattered in low-crisis situations. A similar pattern occurred in Latin America in the 1990s, as Washington Consensus became the dominant paradigm and organized labor decreased in strength.
However, as Pop-Eleches contends, the decreased role of ideology and consequent neoliberal dominance in Latin America of the 1990s is far from a stable outcome, as an altered combination of incentives can reactivate political forces that benefit from anti-neoliberal rhetoric and perhaps policies as well. Thus, the recent leftist turn in Latin American politics may not necessarily be transient.
Addressing the question of compatibility of democracy with neoliberal reforms, Pop-Eleches finds that while neoliberal reforms were at odds with democracy in Latin America in the 1980s, the same was not the case in the 1990s. The changed nature of the economic woes, lower social mobilization and greater sense of security by the well-off resulted in greater stability of electoral democracy. However, the demobilization of society can be a detrimental development in the long-run, not only in normative terms, but also when considering specific political and economic outcomes. By contrast, in Eastern Europe, democracy went hand-in-hand with economic reform, even spurring on the economic reform process.
As the preceding summary indicates, the findings include numerous interaction effects and, given their context specificity, elude sweeping generalizations. While the book systematically explores different facets of the various contexts, what would make the presentation even stronger would be a comprehensive summary of the original hypotheses and the findings.
One of the book's greatest achievements is its portrayal of the nuance of the relationship between international pressures and domestic context. This kind of analysis is conducive to the discussion of policy implications. The author makes several recommendations, most importantly, the increase in financial rewards of compliance, support for state capacity building, striving for impartiality and curbing the practice of "soft conditionality," as well as greater flexibility in the "timing and details of policy resounding success while Romania's a failure, all despite similar legacies and starting points. As the author stated in the preface, the effects of IMF policies were the original motivating question, which he abandoned in favor of exploring the causally prior step of the determinants of IMF programs. Now seems to be a good time to revisit the original question. In fact, the individual case studies seem to suggest that these outcomes may also depend on similar variables to the ones discussed in the present study, namely global/regional economic shocks, corruption, and bureaucratic capacity to come up with solutions that complement orthodox policies.
All in all, From Economic Crisis to Reform is a very rich, carefully researched work that is especially commendable for its ambitious research design, aimed at accounting for the dynamics of international and domestic-level interactions regarding economic reform. Its comprehensive and illuminating nature should make it an indispensable reading for students of international and comparative political economy, international relations and comparative politics more broadly. Its nuanced discussion should also make the book of great interest to area specialists and practitioners alike.
